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The Alien Tort Claims Act in 2007: Resolving the Delicate
Balance Between Judicial and Legislative Authority
HANNAH R. BORNSTEIN*
INTRODUCTION
In the 2004 case Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,l the United States Supreme Court settled
one part of an ongoing debate. The debate centers around the Alien Tort Claims Act
("ATCA"), which allows for suit by "an alien for a tort only, in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States."'2 Enacted in 1789, use of the ATCA remained
dormant until 1980, when a federal court in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala3 allowed a
Paraguayan woman to bring suit against a Paraguayan government official who had
tortured and killed her brother.4 After the Filartiga decision, critics of the ATCA
argued that it granted federal courts jurisdiction over ATCA claims but did not create a
private right of action.5 The Supreme Court, however, ruled that the ATCA not only
grants jurisdiction, but also creates a private right of action. 6 This decision thus allows
human rights victims and their advocates to use the ATCA against individuals who
violate the "law of nations"--meaning those individuals who violate certain rules of
customary international law.7 However, a footnote in the Sosa opinion highlights one
of the most important yet unanswered questions in the continued debate concerning the
scope of the ATCA: "A related consideration is whether international law extends the
scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the
defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or individual.",
8
Prior to Sosa, the question of corporate liability under the ATCA was raised but left
unanswered in Doe Iv. Unocal Corp.9 In the 1990s, Unocal, a United States company,
developed a gas reserve and constructed a pipeline in Burma.10 Unocal utilized the
Burmese government to provide security for the project." Through the course of
providing such security, members of the Burmese government raped, tortured, and
* J.D. Candidate, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington, 2007. B.A., Brandeis
University, 2002, History and German. I would like to thank Professor David Fidler for his
invaluable guidance, knowledge, and comments. I would also like to thank Professor Christiana
Ochoa, as the idea for this Note originated in her International Business Transactions class.
1. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
3. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
4. Id. at 878.
5. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 697.
6. Id. at 714, 719-20.
7. Beth Stephens, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: "The Door is Still Ajar "for Human Rights
Litigation in U.S. Courts, 70 BROOK. L. REv. 533, 555 (2004) (maintaining that after Sosa "the
heart and soul of [ATCA] jurisprudence remains intact: redress for individuals who have
suffered egregious violations of their human rights"). See also Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp.,
406 F.3d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 2003) ("In the context of the ATCA, we have consistently used the
term 'customary international law' as a synonym for the term 'the law of nations."').
8. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 n.20.
9. 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated, reh'g granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003).
10. Id. at 937-38.
11. Id.
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murdered local Burmese citizens in connection with forced labor for the project.' 2 The
harms inflicted upon Burmese citizens by the Unocal project resulted in a lawsuit
against Unocal under the ATCA. The Ninth Circuit initially held that the ATCA could
apply to Unocal.13 However, the court subsequently vacated this holding in light of the
fact that Sosa was pending before the Supreme Court.14 Following Sosa, the Unocal
litigation ultimately culminated in a settlement in 2005 for the Burmese plaintiffs.
EarthRights International, who brought the case on behalf of the plaintiffs, praised the
settlement, calling it "a historic victory for human rights and for the corporate
accountability movement."' 5 While the case settled favorably for the plaintiffs, a
settlement does not create precedent, and thus no court has yet held a corporation liable
under the ATCA.
As transnational corporate activity increases, so too does the likelihood of facing
ATCA litigation. For example, on December 28, 2005, Daewoo International
Corporation announced it had formally secured a large gas reserve in Burma." At a
minimum, the reserve is expected to produce over 600 million barrels of crude oil, and
Daewoo expects the company's value to significantly increase as a result of its
investment in the reserve.' 7 Daewoo owns a sixty percent stake in the project and will
work in conjunction with another Korean gas company and two Indian oil companies.' 8
The Burmese government also expects to realize a significant revenue stream from the
project. 19
While Daewoo and the Burmese government expect to profit from the project,
human rights groups and other advocates have voiced significant concern over the
potentially devastating impact on local Burmese citizens. Burma's military government
has a long history of human rights abuses, and as a result, the United States
government has emphatically expressed its disapproval of the current military
government.20 The Burmese people suffered enormously from the Unocal project.21 As
12. Id. at 939.
13. Id. at 937.
14. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 978, 978-89 (9th Cir. 2002).
15. EarthRights International, Historical Advance for Universal Human Rights: Unocal to
Compensate Burmese Villagers, Apr. 2, 2005, http://www.earthrights.org/legalfeature/historic_
advance for universalhuman rights unocal to compensate burmese villagers.html (follow
PDF file symbol at top of page).
16. Press Release, Daewoo Secures Giant Gas Reserve in Myanmar (Dec. 28, 2005)
http://www.daewoo.com/english/press/prnew list.jsp?work=read&uid=3049.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Executive Summary-Shwe Gas Movement [For a Sustainable Future in a Free and
Democratic Burma], http://www.shwe.org/about-shwe/front-page (last visited May 8, 2007)
("[The] Shwe fields are destined to become the Burmese military government's largest single
source of foreign income.").
20. Paula J. Dobriansky, Under Sec'y for Democracy and Global Affairs, Remarks at
Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement with National Endowment for Democracy and
Church World Service (Oct. 26, 2005), http://www.state.gov/g/rls/rmi/2005/55844.htm ("[W]e
continue to speak out and act against the regime's abuses and in support of Burma's democratic
opposition. The United States works with like-minded countries to maintain maximum
international pressure on the Burmese regime through UN resolutions, robust bilateral and
multilateral sanctions, public diplomacy, and democracy and human rights programs. At the
most recent session of the UN Commission on Human Rights, the United States stood with other
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history foreshadows, the military government almost certainly will play an active role
in providing security and assistance for Daewoo's new project. Human rights abuses
similar to those suffered in Unocal likely may occur again in conjunction with the
Daewoo project. Opponents believe that the project will result in harms to local
Burmese citizens consisting of forced relocation, forced labor, torture, rape, and
extrajudicial killings, as well as environmental and cultural degradation.22
Additionally, ATCA cases against other corporations have been filed in the Ninth
Circuit. Very recently, in Sarei v. Rio Tinto,2 3 the Ninth Circuit decided one aspect of a
claim by residents of Papua New Guinea (PNG) against Rio Tinto, an international
mining company based out of London. 4 The plaintiffs alleged that the PNG
government "committed atrocious human rights abuses and war crimes at the behest of
Rio Tinto." 25 The Ninth Circuit, addressing initial questions ofjurisdiction, reversed
the district court's decision to dismiss the case based on the act of state doctrine, the
political question doctrine, and the doctrine of international comity; the Ninth Circuit
also held that exhaustion of local remedies did not apply to this case. 6 The Ninth
Circuit remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings, and the case is
still before the district court at this time.
27
Individuals or groups suing companies such as Daewoo28 or Rio Tinto for a
violation of the law of nations under the ATCA can expect to face opposition to the
claims on a number of grounds. First, even though Sosa holds that the ATCA allows a
private right of action, opponents of the ATCA may argue that within the American
legal system, Congress-not the courts-should deal with questions of foreign
relations and international law; thus, when courts declare that certain acts violate
customary international law, they are overstepping their constitutionally prescribed
boundaries. This line of reasoning is referred to herein as the separation-of-powers
argument. Second, no evidence of a corporate standard of liability exists under
customary international law, a fact making it unfair for courts to declare and apply
allies and partners to pass a resolution by consensus on Burma.").
21. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 937-40 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated, reh "ggranted,
395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003).
22. See Human Rights Abuses-Shwe Gas Movement [For a Sustainable Future in a Free
and Democratic Burma], http://www.shwe.org/issues/militarization-and-human-rights-abuses
(last visited May 8, 2007).
23. 456 F.3d 1069 (2006).
24. Id. at 1075.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1074.
27. See id. at 1100. The Ninth Circuit also made it clear that the question concerning the
standard of liability was not presented to the court for purposes of this appeal. Id. at 1079 n.6.
28. Although Daewoo is a Korean and thus foreign-owned company, obtaining personal
jurisdiction over Daewoo may in fact be likely, as Daewoo owns several subsidiaries in the
United States. In another ATCA case, where Sudanese plaintiffs brought claims against a
Canadian energy company for violations of the ATCA, the Southern District of New York found
personal jurisdiction over the Canadian-owned company because the company owned and
operated a subsidiary in New York, and the Canadian company thus met the test for
"continuous, permanent, and substantial activity in New York." See Presbyterian Church of
Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 329-31 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting Wiwa
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 2000). One of Daewoo's subsidiaries is
in Los Angeles, and the likelihood that the Ninth Circuit might have to revisit the issue of
corporate liability in the near future is strong.
2007] 1079
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liability standards in a post hoc fashion (the "standard of liability" and "fundamental
fairness" arguments). Third, if a federal court holds a corporation liable under the
ATCA, opponents of the ATCA are likely to urge Congress to repeal the Act
altogether.
This Note confronts these arguments, and argues that although Congress by and
large handles matters of international law and politics, since the 1980 decision in
Filartiga, Congress has neither altered the text of the ATCA nor repealed it
altogether.29 Congress, therefore, has implicitly granted federal courts the authority to
decide what acts will violate customary international law under the ATCA. After
establishing that federal courts are not violating any separation-of-powers principles by
entertaining claims made under the ATCA, this Note addresses the proper standard of
liability a federal court should apply to a corporation accused of violating customary
international law. This Note argues that federal courts should look to the Torture
Victims Protection Act to establish a standard of liability under customary international
law for actions involving a corporation's complicity with a state actor. In declaring a
standard of liability based on customary international law that involves private action
taken by a corporate actor, a federal judge should use the standard of liability used for
individuals in the seminal ATCA case Kadic v. Karad~i6.a0
Resolution of the ambiguity of corporate liability is crucial for three reasons. First,
new cases against corporations will, in all likelihood, be filed under the ATCA.
Second, plaintiffs, defendants, and the courts deciding these cases need clarity.3' Third,
resolving the ambiguity gives corporations prospective clarity with respect to their
future behavior. A clear standard will allow corporations to assess the risks of foreign
investment more accurately and lower transaction costs. According to Professor Steven
Ratner, "The... atmosphere of uncertainty will be detrimental to both the protection
29. The Military Commissions Act of 2006 does prevent federal courts from exercising
ATCA jurisdiction over claims against United States military and personnel concerning any
aspect of the detention of an alien detained as an enemy combatant if the alien was detained
after September 11, 2001; this, in effect, amends the ATCA with respect to these potential
defendants. Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 7(a)(2), (b), Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat.
2600.
30. 70 F.3d 232,236 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that Karadlid as an individual "maybe found
liable for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity in his private capacity").
31. Some federal courts still look to the standard of liability set forth in Unocal. See
Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 244 F. Supp. at 314 (denying the corporation's motion to
dismiss based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction and citing to the aiding and abetting
standard established by the Ninth Circuit in Unocal in denying the motion). However, the
standard has been criticized and attacked. See John Haberstroh, The Alien Tort Claims Act &
Doe v. Unocal: A Paquete-Habana Approach to the Rescue, 32 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 231,
268-73 (2004) (criticizing the Ninth Circuit's reliance on international criminal tribunals to
establish a civil complicity standard and recommending a Paquete-Habana approach, where a
federal court would review aiding and abetting standards of tort violations throughout the
world's legal systems); Edwin V. Woodsome, Jr., and T. Jason White, Corporate Liability for
Conduct of a Foreign Government: The Ninth Circuit Adopts a "Reason to Know" Standardfor
Aiding andAbetting Liability Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 26 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.
REv. 89 (2003) (criticizing the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the standards set forth in the
international criminal tribunals). Thus, in light of the fact that the Ninth Circuit vacated its
opinion and that the standard set has been criticized, corporations cannot be certain of what
standard other federal courts might use.
1080 [Vol. 82:1077
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of human rights and the economic wealth that private business activity has created
worldwide. 32 A federal court must apply a standard so that all parties involved may
move forward efficiently and with an adequate measure of predictability.
33
In light of the range of arguments and controversies surrounding the ATCA, this
Note then recommends specific actions Congress can take that will quiet the debate
surrounding the separation-of-powers argument, the standard of liability argument, and
the fundamental fairness argument. This Note argues that Congress should amend the
ATCA, eliminate the phrase "the law of nations," and instead list the specific acts that
are redressible under the Act. Such an amendment should mirror the Torture Victims
Protection Act34 and the Military Commissions Act of 2006,35 where Congress supplied
a specific list of what constitutes torture in the former, and which acts violate Geneva
Convention Common Article III in the latter. This Note argues that Congress should
amend the ATCA to list the specific acts for which state officials, individuals, and
corporations can be held liable. In doing so, Congress will have (a) established a
standard of liability not only for state officials, but also for private individuals and
corporations; (b) put corporations on notice of which acts will give rise to liability
under the ATCA; and (c) created a powerful state practice capable of influencing the
way in which other states approach the issue of corporate liability for torts committed
in violation of customary international law.
Part I of this Note presents the evolution of cases interpreting the ATCA. The
evolution of case law shows how, beginning with Filartiga and ending with Sosa,
ATCA case law has departed from the original intent of the statute. Part II addresses
the separation-of-powers argument and argues that post-Sosa, absent congressional
action to effectively amend or repeal the ATCA, federal courts are not violating the
separation-of-powers principle by determining what acts violate customary
international law under the ATCA. Part III then examines the standard of corporate
liability a federal court should establish in the event that Congress fails to amend or
repeal the ATCA. Because courts and commentators continue to look to the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Unocal, this Note examines the ambiguities the Ninth Circuit
created in Unocal. This Note then argues that the standard set by the Ninth Circuit is
incorrect, and recommends the standards federal courts should apply in the future,
absent congressional action to amend or repeal the ATCA. Part IV then recommends
the amendments Congress should make to the ATCA. Congress must specify which
acts will create liability under the ATCA not only because such action will end the
separation-of-powers debate, but also because it will confer democratic legitimacy
upon the idea that if corporations commit grave breaches of international law, they can
and will be held accountable.
32. Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory ofLegal Responsibility,
111 YALE L.J. 443, 448 (2001).
33. In positing that international legal standards apply to corporations, Steven Ratner
writes, "Without some international legal standards, we will likely continue to witness both
excessive claims made against [corporations] for their responsibility and counterclaims by
corporate actors against such accountability." Id.
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
35. § 6(d), Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.
2007]
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
I. EVOLUTION OF THE ATCA
The full text of the ATCA provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the United States., 36 Enacted in 1789, the First Congress
failed to create any meaningful legislative history concerning the purpose and scope of
the ATCA.37 A review of historical events at the time, however, sheds light on the
original purpose of the Act. The Continental Congress had a difficult time compelling
states to vindicate rights sounding in the law of nations, particularly rights under
treaties and the rights of ambassadors. 38 For example, in the Marbois "incident," the
Secretary of the French Legion was assaulted in Philadelphia. 39 While the French
government wanted Mr. Marbois's rights vindicated, the Continental Congress lacked
the power to require Pennsylvania to act.40 Against this background, the Framers
passed the Judiciary Act, which enhanced the federal government's power over the
affairs of ambassadors and diplomacy, among other things.4 1 The ATCA was part of
the general plan to vest the federal judiciary with jurisdiction over specific causes of
action.42 Thus, it is important to note that the ATCA was not designed to vindicate the
rights of foreigners for harms incurred overseas, but to vindicate the rights of
foreigners whose international rights43 had been violated while in U.S. territory.
Plaintiffs seldom invoked the statute until 1980, 44 when the Second Circuit allowed
the ATCA to be applied against a Paraguayan government official who had tortured
and killed the plaintiffs' immediate family member.45 International law prohibited
official torture, and the court held that the federal courts had jurisdiction under the
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
37. Sosav. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 718 (2004).
38. See id. at 717.
39. Id. at 716.
40. See id. at 717. The Continental Congress could pass a resolution "recommending" that
states take a course of action.
The Congress could only pass resolutions, one approving the state-court
proceedings... another directing the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to apologize and
to 'explain to Mr. De Marbois [sic] the difficulties that may arise... from the
nature of a federal union,' ... and to explain to the representative of Louis XVI
that 'many allowances are to be made for' the young Nation.
Id. at 717 n. 11 (internal citations omitted).
41. Id. at 717. Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution vests the "Supreme
Court with original jurisdiction over 'all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public ministers
and Consuls."' Id. See also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 782 (D.C. Cir.
1984) ("There is evidence ... that the intent of [the ATCA] was to assure aliens access to
federal courts to vindicate any incident which, if mishandled by a state court, might blossom
into an international crisis.").
42. See Sosa, 524 U.S. at 717-1-8.
43. The rights available to individuals at this time were very limited; these rights were
essentially limited to "violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and
piracy." Id. at 715 (quoting WILLAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *68).
44. Lori Delaney, Note, Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corporation: The Second Circuit
Fails to Set a Threshold for Corporate Alien Tort Claims Act Liability, 25 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 205, 208 (2004).
45. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
1082 [Vol. 82:1077
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ATCA to hear the case regardless of the fact that a foreign official committed the
torture.46 Thus, 1980 marks the beginning of the present debate over the scope of the
ATCA: against whom does the ATCA apply? Filartiga and other cases prior to Unocal
began to shed some light on the question.
A. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala
47
The Second Circuit's decision in Filartiga established the framework for all
subsequent ATCA litigation. Dolly Filartiga and her father, Dr. Joel Filartiga, filed suit
in the Eastern District of New York against Americo Noberto Pena-Irala.4' The
Filartigas alleged that Pena-Irala had tortured and killed Joelito Filartiga, Dolly's
brother and Dr. Filartiga's son.4 9 At the time the Filartigas filed the suit, they possessed
Paraguayan citizenship.50 Mr. Pena-Irala worked for the Paraguayan government and
had Paraguayan citizenship as well.5' Dolly had entered the United States and sought
political asylum by the time of the suit.5 2 The Filartigas served Mr. Pena-Irala with a
summons and complaint while he was in the United States on a tourist visa.
53
The Second Circuit examined Supreme Court precedent in order to determine
whether the prohibition against torture constituted customary international law. The
Second Circuit identified three sources to which a federal court may refer to establish
the existence of a rule of customary international law: academic commentary, the
"usage and practice of nations," or judicial decisions.54 The Second Circuit examined
the United Nations Charter and a number of United Nations declarations and
concluded by saying, "Turning to the act of torture, we have little difficulty discerning
its universal renunciation in the modem usage and practice of nations." 55 The Second
Circuit also stated that "it is clear that courts must interpret international law not as it
was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among the nations of the world today."
56
In this decision, the Second Circuit opened the doors of federal courthouses to
ATCA litigation from anywhere in the world so that plaintiffs could allege violations of
46. Id. at 880.
47. Several works trace in-depth the evolution of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala and the cases
following. See Delaney, supra note 44, at 207-18; Lorelle Londis, Comment, The Corporate
Face of the Alien Tort Claims Act: How an Old Statute Mandates a New Understanding of
Global Interdependence, 57 ME. L. REv. 141, 155-78 (2005); Shaw W. Scott, Note, Taking
Riggs Seriously: TheATCA Case Against a Corporate Abettor ofPinochet Atrocities, 89 MINN.
L. REv. 1497, 1506-27 (2004).
48. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 878-79.
54. Id. at 880 (quoting United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820)).
The Second Circuit also cited The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900), where the Supreme
Court held that if no treaty, legislative act, or judicial decision existed, courts must look to the
customs of nations. Courts may ascertain those customs by looking to academic commentary.
Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880-81 (citing Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700).
55. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 883 (citing Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 160-61).
56. Id. at 881.
10832007]
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the prohibition against torture and perhaps other rules of customary international law.
The Second Circuit's decision also set the stage for academic commentators and judges
to begin struggling with the separation-of-powers question and the issue of whether
federal courts should interpret the evolution of customary international law.
B. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic5
7
At this point in the evolution of the ATCA case law, Judge Bork's concurring
opinion in Tel-Oren reflects the growing concern that the federal courts should not be
interpreting the evolution of customary international law. In Tel-Oren, the D.C. Circuit
issued a per curiam opinion, dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction an action
brought predominantly by Israeli citizens who were survivors or representatives of
individuals killed during an armed assault on a bus in Israel. 8 The per curiam opinion
said nothing about the basis for the dismissal, but Judge Bork elaborated upon his
reasoning. Citing the separation-of-powers principle, Judge Bork asserted that the
executive and legislative branches, not the judiciary, should determine questions
involving foreign relations and the status of customary international law. 59 Due to his
concern for the separation-of-powers principle, Judge Bork opined that the ATCA
granted jurisdiction only, and that a separate cause of action had to be found in order
for the appellants to continue. 60 He stated that treaties, the common law, acts of
Congress, and customary international law all failed to grant an express cause of action
for torture, and he therefore determined that the appellants lacked a viable cause of
action.
61
C. Kadic v. Karad~i662 and Its Progeny
The scope of the ATCA broadened in 1995 in Kadic when the Second Circuit
expanded the ATCA to include liability for certain private, individual actions. A group
of plaintiffs consisting of Croats and Muslims from Bosnia-Herzegovina sued
Karad~i, the president of a Bosnian-Serb republic within Bosnia-Herzogevina.63 The
plaintiffs alleged that Karad~i6 ordered and directed acts including rape, torture, and
summary execution.64 The plaintiffs served suit on him while he was in New York
visiting the United Nations.65 The district court held that, because Karadli6's republic
did not constitute a formally recognized state, Karad~i did not commit any violations
under the color of state law.66 The Second Circuit reversed, holding that certain acts-
genocide, war crimes, or slavery-violated the law of nations when committed by state
actors or private individuals.67 The Second Circuit held that Karad~i6 as an individual
57. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
58. Id. at 775.
59. Id. at 801-05, 808 (Bork, J., concurring).
60. Id. at 801-02.
61. Id. at 808-19.
62. 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
63. Id. at 236-37.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 237.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 239-40 ("[w]e do not agree that the law of nations, as understood in the modem
1084 [Vol. 82:1077
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"may be found liable for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity in his
private capacity."68 Whereas Filartiga allowed suit against a public official, the Second
Circuit in Kadic opened the door for private liability under the ATCA for violations of
certain rules of customary international law. The decision, however, created the
possibility that plaintiffs could apply the ATCA not only against individual persons but
also against corporations.
69
Indeed, following the Second Circuit's decision in Kadic, lawsuits against
corporations proliferated. Most lawsuits against corporations have been dismissed for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction or other jurisdictional grounds, such as forum non
conviens. 70 Nevertheless, not only has the number of lawsuits increased, but the subject
matter of the claims also has expanded to include environmental and social harms, as
plaintiffs arguably have attempted to determine the boundary of the "law of nations"
under the ATCA. Two cases reflect this phenomenon: Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran,
Inc. 71 and Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp.72
In Beanal, the plaintiffs attempted to hold Freeport-McMoran Copper and Gold
("Freeport McMoran"), a mining company, liable for environmental harms and
"cultural genocide," 73 alleging that Freeport McMoran's mining activities harmed the
environment and surrounding habitat to such an extent that the tribal community was
forced to relocate.74 These allegations represent an expansion of the nature of claims
brought under the ATCA: whereas the plaintiffs in Filartiga and Kadic brought claims
concerning acts of torture and war crimes-acts that are much less controversial in
terms of whether they rise to a level of violating customary international law-the
plaintiffs in Beanal attempted to argue that acts resulting in environmental abuses and
"cultural genocide" also rose to the level of violating customary international law. The
Fifth Circuit, however, refused to allow the plaintiffs' claims to go forward. The court
held that cultural genocide "has [not] achieved universal acceptance as a discrete
violation of international law.",
75
Similar attempts to broaden the scope of the ATCA's application have been made in
other federal jurisdictions. For instance, in Flores, the Second Circuit addressed claims
brought by Peruvian nationals against the Southern Peru Copper Corporation (SPCC),
which maintained its headquarters in Arizona and conducted its primary business
era, confines its reach to state action. Instead, we hold that certain forms of conduct violate the
law of nations whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or only as
private individuals. An early example of the application of the law of nations to the acts of
private individuals is the prohibition against piracy.").
68. Id. at 236.
69. But see Delaney, supra note 44, at 213 (arguing that Kadic limits the ATCA to private
individuals only and does not apply to corporations).
70. For a list of cases brought against corporations after the decision in Kadic, see Delaney,
supra note 44, at 208-09 n.26.
71. 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999).
72. No. 02-9008, 2003 WL 24049712 (2d Cir. Aug. 29, 2003) (depublished). Per the
request of the court, this case has been withdrawn from publication, and an amended opinion
will be issued. At the present time, citations will appear to page numbers starting at page one, as
indicated on Westlaw.
73. Beanal, 197 F.3d at 163.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 168.
2007] 1085
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operations in Peru.76 The plaintiffs argued that SPCC committed egregious
environmental harms, alleging that SPCC emitted "large quantities of sulfur dioxide
and very fine particles of heavy metals into the local air and water., 77 The plaintiffs
claimed that these harms violated customary international law by violating their "right
to life [and] right to health., 78 The Second Circuit ruled against the plaintiffs and held
that SPCC's acts did not constitute violations of customary international law. The court
held that the "'right to life' and 'right to health' are insufficiently definite to constitute
rules of customary international law.",79 The court also held that customary
international law does not prohibit intranational pollution.8 0 Thus, the Second Circuit
rejected the plaintiffs' attempt to expand the scope of the ATCA to cover acts
committed by corporations involving harms caused by environmental abuses.
D. The Debate Leading Up to Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
8 1
Doe I v. Unocal Corp. is arguably the most well-known ATCA case. The district
court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims, ruling that Unocal did not incur liability for
complicity with state action, as Unocal did not satisfy the "color of law" standard.
82
Additionally, the court held that Unocal did not incur liability for private action
because it did not actively participate in causing the plaintiffs' injuries.83 On appeal,
the Ninth Circuit initially held that Unocal would be found liable for aiding and
abetting the Burmese government in forced labor if the plaintiffs could show that
Unocal engaged in "knowing practical assistance or encouragement that [had] a
substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime." 4 The Ninth Circuit vacated the
decision pending the Supreme Court's decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.8 5 After
Sosa, the case settled before reaching the jury on the merits.86
76. Flores, 2003 WL 24049712, at *1.
77. Id. at *2.
78. Id.
79. Id. (citing Amended Complaint at 1, 59-75, Flores, 2003 WL 24049712 (No. 02-
9008)).
80. Id. at *18; cf The United Nations Conference on the Environment, June 5-16, 1972,
Stockholm, Swed., Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
Principle 21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev. 1 (1973), available at
http://www.unep.org/Documents.multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentlID=97&ArticlelD=1503
(requiring states, under environmental law, to ensure that activities within their domestic
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other states).
81. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
82. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1307, 1310 (C.D. Cal. 2000), aff'din
part, rev'd in part, Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated, reh'g
granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003).
83. Id. at 1310.
84. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 947. In establishing this aiding and abetting standard, the three-
judge panel placed particular emphasis on decisions established by the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Id. at
949-50. For criticism of the Ninth Circuit's choice of law analysis, see Haberstroh, supra note
31, at 257-68.
85. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 952-54.
86. EarthRights International, "Final Settlement Reached in Doe v. Unocal," Mar. 2 1,
2005, http://www.earthrights.org/legalfeaturelfinalsettlementreached-in-doe-v.unocal.html.
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E. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
Despite the increase in litigation under the ATCA since Filartiga, the United States
Supreme Court did not review any ATCA cases until its 2004 Sosa decision. Sosa
involved an individual defendant who assisted the United States government in
arresting Mr. Alvarez-Machain in Mexico for alleged complicity in the murder of a
DEA official.8 7 The Court denied Alvarez-Machain's claim on the grounds that his
arbitrary arrest did not rise to the level of violating the law of nations.88 Prior to the
ruling, a hot debate arose over whether the ATCA granted only jurisdiction or also
created a private cause of action.8 9 There was also a debate as to the exact meaning of
"to violate the law of nations." 90 The Court clarified that the ATCA did in fact create a
private cause of action as well as grant jurisdiction. 91 Contrary to Judge Bork's 1984
concurrence in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,92 the Court also ruled that lower
federal courts must find that a claim "rest[s] on a norm of international character
accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the
features of the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized., 93 The latter ruling,
although it still does not provide maximum clarity as to what modem actions fall within
this paradigm, precludes claims like those made in Flores and Beanal from going
forward. The Court in Sosa did not address whether a corporation could be held liable
under the ATCA; rather, in a footnote, it acknowledged that liability under the ATCA
for private actors, including corporations, remains a "related consideration."
94
Human rights advocates praised Sosa because it does not require plaintiffs to
establish a separate cause of action. As one commentator opined, "[Sosa] is a clear
victory for those human rights advocates who view the statute as a means to hold the
most egregious perpetrators accountable for the most egregious violations of
international law." 95 Yet two questions remain after Sosa: first, does the ATCA apply
to corporations? Unocal points to a trend moving in that direction, but the Supreme
Court left the question open. Second, what rules of customary international law within
87. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 697-98 (2004).
88. Id. at 738.
89. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article II, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 587,
591 (2002) (arguing that the ATCA does not create a private right of action); Gabriel D. Pinilla,
Comment, Corporate Liability for Human Rights Violations on Foreign Soil: A Historical and
Prospective Analysis of the Alien Tort Claims Controversy, 16 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 687, 702-08
(2004) (engaging in an extensive analysis of the arguments for and against recognizing a private
cause of action under the ATCA).
90. See Tawny A. Bridgeford, Case Note, Imputing Human Rights Obligations on
Multinational Corporations: The Ninth Circuit Strikes Again in Judicial Activism, 18 AM. U.
INT'L L. REv. 1009, 1038-50 (2003) (arguing that the Ninth Circuit's decision in Unocal
erroneously declared that forced labor is a modem variant of slavery).
91. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724.
92. See supra Part I.B.
93. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.
94. Id. at 732 n.20.
95. See Stephens, supra note 7, at 535.
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Sosa's paradigm could actually be violated by corporations, either in connection with
states or independent of state action?
96
II. THE SEPARATION-OF-POWERS ARGUMENT
Article III of the United States Constitution governs the jurisdiction of the federal
courts:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made ... to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; to
Controversies between two or more States; between a State and Citizens of another
State; between Citizens of different States .... 97
Thus, in Filartiga, the Second Circuit had to determine whether it had jurisdiction to
hear the case. The case did not involve a diversity action between citizens of two
states, nor did it involve a claim arising under the Constitution or a treaty.98 The
Second Circuit held, however, that the "law of nations," or customary international
law, is part of the "Laws of the United States." 99 The court stated, "[t]he constitutional
basis for the Alien Tort Statute is the law of nations, which has always been part of the
federal common law."l°° The court went on to say that a case arises under the laws of
the United States if it is "grounded upon statutes enacted by Congress or upon the
common law of the United States"; since the law of nations is part of the common law,
it is also part of the "laws of the United States." Therefore, the court had jurisdiction to
hear Filartiga's claim.'
0
Opponents of the ATCA argue that, if a political branch has not expressly
incorporated a rule of customary international law, federal courts should not decide
what actions violate the customary international law rule. These critics argue that, post-
Erie, the political branches must expressly incorporate international law into domestic
law, and only then may the courts decide whether an actor has violated that law.
102
Thus, in the absence of any incorporation by Congress, they argue that customary
international law is not federal law and cannot impose any duties on nonstate actors.
10 3
This argument is based on the idea that determinations of whether the United States
recognizes a rule of customary international law rest with the political branches of the
96. Armin Rosencranz & David Louk, Doe v. Unocal: Holding Corporations Liable for
Human Rights Abuses on Their Watch, 8 CHAP. L. REv. 135, 151 (2005) ("It is unclear from
Sosa whether corporations that 'aid and abet' repressive foreign governments with whom they
do business may be held liable under the ATCA.").
97. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
98. Cf Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REv. 815, 851 (1997).
99. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 886 (2d Cir. 1980).
100. Id.at 885.
101. Id. at 886.
102. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 98, at 849, 852-53.
103. Id. at 831-34. See also Donald J. Kochan, Sovereignty and the American Courts at the
Cocktail Party of International Law: The Dangers of Domestic Judicial Invocations ofForeign
and International Law, 29 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 507, 539 (2006).
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federal government. These opponents rely "on the principle that the federal political
branches, and not the courts, are constitutionally authorized and institutionally
competent to make foreign relations judgments."' 4 Thus, to include customary
international law as part of the great body of federal common law-that is, court-made
law-would disrupt the balance of power prescribed by the Constitution.0 5 Curtis
Bradley and Jack Goldsmith criticize the present state of the ATCA doctrine because it
allows judges to make their own personal decisions as to what is customary
international law.' 0 6 Donal Kochan agrees, stating, "To the extent private plaintiffs are
allowed to sue nation-states or corporations acting in concert with such states for
alleged human rights' abuses, judicial decisions necessarily make pronouncements
regarding the appropriate behavior of foreign countries."'
10 7
On the other side of the debate are those who believe that customary international
law will apply despite a lack of incorporation by the political branches:
In the absence of such incorporation of [customary international law] norms by the
federal political branches, the prevailing view is that [customary international law]
nevertheless has the status of federal law, in the form of federal common law.
Under this view, no congressional authorization is necessary in order for courts to
apply [customary international law] as federal law; indeed, courts are bound to do
so even in the absence of such authorization. 10
8
Thus, proponents of the federal common law interpretation of the ATCA do not
believe that the political branches must specifically state which acts violate the law of
nations in order for courts to hear claims under the ATCA and decide what acts violate
the law of nations.'09
Although the Supreme Court held in Sosa that the ATCA does create a private
cause of action for egregious violations of certain rules of customary international law,
a strong separation-of-powers argument persists that Congress must still clarify which
rules of customary international law fall within the scope of the ATCA. The problem,
however, is that Congress had numerous opportunities to either amend or repeal the
ATCA since Filartiga if it did not wish for the courts to make determinations regarding
what rules of customary international law fall within the ATCA's scope. Congress
could have acted in 1980 when the Second Circuit opened the doors of the ATCA with
the Filartiga decision, or in 1995 when the Second Circuit held in Kadic that an
individual may be held liable under the ATCA for a limited number of acts that do not
require state action. Congress also could have acted in response to the multiple
decisions rendered in the Doe I v. Unocal Corp. litigation. Most importantly, Congress
could have acted in 2004 when the Supreme Court declared in Sosa that the ATCA
created a private cause of action for violations of certain types of rules of customary
104. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 98, at 861.
105. See id. at 861.
106. Id. at 864.
107. Donald J. Kochan, No Longer Little Known but Now a Door Ajar: An Overview of the
Enduring and Dangerous Role of the Alien Tort Statute in Human Rights and International Law
Jurisprudence, 8 CHAP. L. REv. 103, 130 (2005).
108. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 98, at 820 (citations omitted).
109. Political branches, nevertheless, can still incorporate customary international law, so the
matter does not rest entirely within the judicial domain.
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international law. Over two years have passed since the Sosa decision. The failure of
Congress to either fully amend l l° or repeal the Act may indicate that Congress is
content to let the federal courts decide which rules of customary international law fall
within the scope of the ATCA. In light of congressional inaction, we must assume that
Congress does not believe that federal courts violate the separation-of-powers doctrine
when they decide cases under the ATCA. Therefore, courts should continue to follow
the guidelines set forth by the Supreme Court in Sosa to determine what rules of
customary international law fall under the ATCA.
However, even if the separation-of-powers question has subsided after Sosa, federal
courts will continue to face further problems when deciding ATCA cases. Establishing
a standard of liability for corporate conduct is one such problem.
III. THE STANDARD OF LiABiLrrY ARGUMENT
This Part addresses the standard of liability applicable to corporations under the
Act. Under customary international law and the ATCA, what should the standard of
liability be if a corporation "aids and abets" a foreign government? Should
corporations be held liable only for acts committed in conjunction with state action, or
can corporations be held liable for private action as well? If corporations can be held
liable without connection to state action, what is the standard of liability for such
private action?
A. The Problem of Establishing a Standard Under
Customary International Law
Customary international law is defined as follows: "[A] general and consistent
practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation."'11 This definition
consists of objective and subjective requirements. Not only must a practice be followed
by states, the states themselves must also have a "sense" of a legal obligation to follow
the practice.
There are fundamental problems with this definition. An inherent circularity lies
within its requirements: "[H]ow, it is asked, can there be a sense of legal obligation
before the law from which the legal obligation derives has matured?"' 1 2 In other words,
a practice becomes law when states sense they have a legal obligation to follow it. But
how can states sense a legal obligation until something has become a law? Problems
other than the circularity issue exist as well. 1 3 For example, in assessing whether
something constitutes general and consistent state practice, one must decide whether to
analyze "word versus action" evidence. 14 Analyzing word versus action evidence
110. But see supra note 29.
111. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2)
(1987).
112. Id. § 102(2) cmt. 2.
113. For an in-depth analysis of the flaws inherent in the definition of customary
international law, see David P. Fidler, Challenging the Classical Concept of Custom:
Perspectives on the Future of Customary International Law, 39 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 198,
199-216 (1996); see also Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 115 (2005).
114. Fidler, supra note 113, at 202.
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raises further problems when words and actions differ," 15 when a state's words don't
match its intentions," 16 or when states behave in a certain manner without explaining
the rationale behind their behavior." 7 Despite the circularity and other innate
difficulties within this basic definition, this definition of customary international law
remains the one within which courts must operate.
B. Does Customary International Law Apply to Corporations?
Classical international law only applied to states and their actions. "8 World War II
and its aftermath, however, significantly influenced both international law and human
rights concepts. After World War II, international law evolved to prohibit certain acts,
including "torture, genocide, summary or extra-judicial execution, [and] war
crimes."" 19 For example, at Nuremberg, individual Germans-rather than Germany
itself-were held accountable for atrocities committed during the War. In terms of
corporate behavior, several German industrialists were charged at Nuremberg
individually for their role in assisting the Nazis.120 The growth of international rules
applicable directly to individual behavior can be traced to the Nuremberg Trials, in
international humanitarian law building on the Nuremberg precedent, and the
development of international criminal law that held nonstate actors accountable for
their actions under international law.'
2
'
In addition to the evolution of international law norms in the mid-twentieth century,
recent decades have also witnessed significant change within the global community. 122
Globalization has increased, and significantly more companies invest and conduct
business abroad. 123 Corporations do business outside of their home nation and thus
often operate outside of the realm of the home nation's law, making it difficult for the
home nation to hold a corporation accountable given traditional international rules of
extraterritorial application of domestic law.' 24 Host nations also may have difficulties
holding corporations accountable, either because the host nation lacks the resources or
the desire to hold corporations accountable, or because the host nation actually
encourages the corporation to engage in conduct that violates international law.' 25
115. Id. at 207.
116. Id. at203.
117. Id. at205.
118. See, e.g., Sukanya Pillay, And Justice For All? Globalization, Multinational
Corporations, and the Needfor Legally Enforceable Human Rights Protections, 81 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 489, 502 (2004).
119. Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Alien Tort Claims Act: Theoretical and Historical
Foundations ofthe Alien Tort Claims Act and Its Discontents: A Reality Check, 16 ST. THOMAS
L. REv. 585, 591 (2004).
120. E.g., Ratner, supra note 32, at 447-48; Woodsome & White, supra note 31, at 100-03.
121. See Jordan J. Paust, The Other Side ofRight: Private Duties Under Human Rights Law,
5 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 51, 58-59 (1992).
122. Cf. Scott, supra note 47, at 1527.
123. See Ratner, supra note 32, at 459 ("Annual increases in foreign investment have
significantly outpaced growth in international trade.").
124. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998).
125. Ratner, supra note 32, at 461-63.
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Because corporations increasingly do more business internationally, the traditional
view of international law governing only state actors has shifted to a more modem
viewpoint that international law governs individuals, nongovernmental organizations,
and corporations. 126 As one commentator observes, "International law, especially in the
last two decades or so, has seen far greater participation by non-state entities in the
processes that lead to its development."1 27 Although nonstate entities have increased
their participation in the process of making international law,1 28 the question remains
whether corporations can be directly liable for actions in violation of customary
international law.
Courts should carefully analyze arguments maintaining that international law
already imposes direct obligations on corporations. Professor Steven Ratner, in an
article on corporate accountability for human rights abuses, writes that "[i]n reviewing
recent trends, one discovers that international law has already effectively recognized
duties of corporations.... The question is not whether nonstate actors have rights and
duties, but what those rights and duties are."' 129 Ratner's arguments, however, are not
entirely persuasive. Ratner gives examples of corporate "duties" in areas such as
international labor law, international environmental law, and international law against
corruption. 130 However, most of the "international duties" arise through treaty law, and
require states to implement the treaty into domestic law. After the implementation, the
corporation has duties; but these duties are domestic obligations rather than
international obligations. Furthermore, even if corporations were to have duties under
customary international law as Ratner claims, the examples from international labor
and environmental law will not rise to the narrow level of accepted claims of
customary international law required by Sosa.
The trend seen throughout ATCA litigation, however, is to recognize the possibility
of corporate liability under customary international law. For example, Unocal's
complicity standard clearly indicates that the Ninth Circuit believed customary
international law applied to corporations, as does its most recent decision in Sarei. The
most persuasive argument for holding corporations liable under the ATCA is that
corporations are "legal persons," and just as individuals can be liable under the ATCA
for certain actions, so can corporations. Furthermore, if a federal court eventually holds
that the ATCA applies to corporations, it will create a strong showing of state practice,
which can be utilized by other federal courts and other countries in establishing that
certain, limited customary international law rules will apply to corporations.131
126. See Dr. Isabella D. Bunn, GlobalAdvocacyfor Corporate Accountability: Transatlantic
Perspectives from the NGO Community, 19 AM. U. INT'LL. REv. 1265, 1301-04 (2004); Todd
Weiler, Balancing Human Rights and Investor Protection: A New Approach for a Different
Legal Order, 27 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 429,440-44 (2004); Scott, supra note 47, at 1513.
127. Simon Chesterman, Oil and Water: Regulating the Behavior of Multinational
Corporations Through Law, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 307, 309 (2004).
128. INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMs, ACTORS, PROCESS 204-07 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Steven R.
Ratner, & David Wippman, eds., 2d ed. 2006).
129. Ratner, supra note 32, at 475-76.
130. Id. at 477-88.
131. Again, because Congress has not repealed or significantly amended the ATCA, federal
courts will not violate separation-of-powers principles by applying customary international law
to corporations under the ATCA.
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C. Doe I v. Unocal Corp.: Did the Ninth Circuit Establish
the Right Standard of Liability?
It is important to bear in mind that the ATCA is a federal statute, and not a
constitutional grant ofjurisdiction. As with any statutory law, if Congress does not like
the court's interpretation of the statute, it can simply amend the statute to eviscerate the
court's holding. Therefore, any federal court that imposes liability on a corporation
must do so carefully.
1. The Standard Established for Corporate Complicity with
State Violations of Customary International Law
In examining whether Unocal would be liable for violations of customary
international law, the district court granted Unocal's motion for summary judgment and
ruled on both the complicity argument as well as the individual liability argument: (1)
with respect to the complicity argument, the court ruled that Unocal was not the
proximate cause of the government's violations because the plaintiffs had provided
insufficient evidence as to whether Unocal exercised control over the government's
actions, and thus the plaintiffs had no "color of law" claim against Unocal;132 and (2)
although forced labor had become a modern variant of slavery, and thus Unocal
potentially could be liable for its individual actions, Unocal would not be individually
liable because the plaintiffs had failed to prove that Unocal actively participated in or
"sought to employ" forced labor.1 33 In other words, the plaintiffs failed to prove that
Unocal's actions met the standard required for complicity with state action or that
Unocal's actions gave rise to private, individual liability.
On appeal, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's
decision to grant Unocal's motion for summary judgment. 134 Upon review, the panel
agreed with the district court's ruling that forced labor was a modern variant of slavery,
and stated "[a]ccordingly, forced labor, like traditional variants of slave trading, is
among the 'handful of crimes ... to which the law of nations attributes individual
liability.'"135 It is worth noting that the court, without analysis, assumed that standards
for individual liability applied to corporations and that individual criminal liability can
translate into individual civil liability. The panel consulted the International War
Crimes Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda to establish the complicity standard.
136
The panel stated that Unocal would be found liable for aiding and abetting the
Burmese government with respect to violating the prohibition on forced labor if the
plaintiffs could show that Unocal engaged in "knowing practical assistance or
encouragement that [had] a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime."', 37 In
132. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1307 (C.D. Cal. 2000), aff'd in part,
rev'din part, Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated, reh "g granted, 395
F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003).
133. Id. at 1310.
134. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 937.
135. Id. at 946 (quoting Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774,794-95 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (emphasis in original)).
136. Id. at 949-50. For criticism of the Ninth Circuit's choice of law analysis, see
Haberstroh, supra note 31, at 231.
137. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 947.
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reversing the district court, the panel concluded that the plaintiffs had presented
sufficient evidence that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Unocal
gave knowing practical assistance or encouragement to the Burmese military in its
commissions of forced labor, as well as rape and murder in connection with forced
labor.138 However, the panel also concluded that the plaintiffs had presented
insufficient evidence for finding a genuine issue of material fact as to their claims of
torture in connection with forced labor.' 39 But as the following Section demonstrates,
the standard adopted by this three-judge panel is vague and ambiguous. 140
2. Ambiguities Created by the Standard
The panel's standard for corporate complicity to a government's actions created
ambiguities because it failed to clarify whether a corporation's liability must be tied to
state action that violates customary international law. Several appellate courts have
agreed that liability can attach for certain acts committed by private individuals if the
acts are committed in pursuit of activities such as genocide, war crimes, or forced
labor. 141 The ambiguity in Unocal is that the panel established a corporate complicity
standard that expressly tied corporate behavior to significant state action that violated
customary international law, but it did so without noting whether such state action was
required for the corporate complicity claim.
The panel stated that Unocal could be liable for its own private actions. The Ninth
Circuit panel stated that "forced labor is a modem variant of slavery that, like
traditional variants of slave trading, does not require state action to give rise to liability
under the ATCA. 1 42 The panel then immediately launched into its analysis for
establishing a standard that would hold Unocal liable for aiding and abetting the
Burmese government143 _a standard for complicity with state action. The facts of the
case warrant this criticism. The panel found that both Unocal and the government were
involved in the conduct: "The practical assistance took the form of [Unocal] hiring the
Myanmar Military to provide security and build infrastructure along the pipeline route
138. Id. at 952-54.
139. Id.
140. In 2003, in light of the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in Sosa, the Ninth Circuit
ordered that the case be reheard en banc, and specifically stated, "The three-judge panel opinion
shall not be cited as precedent by or to this court or any district of the Ninth Circuit, except to
the extent adopted by the en banc court." Id. at 978-79. Despite the fact that the Ninth Circuit
vacated the standard established by the opinion of the three-member panel-and thus eliminated
any explicit precedent in the Ninth Circuit holding corporations liable under the ATCA--other
federal courts continue to look to the panel's decision for guidance. See, e.g., Presbyterian
Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). Thus,
the Doe v. Unocal standard remains both important and controversial for ATCA jurisprudence
on corporate liability. The Ninth Circuit in Sarei noted that "[w]e do not reach the separate
question, which has not been presented to us on appeal, of what standard must govern such
determinations of liability. Whether and how the plaintiffs will be able to prove their dramatic
allegations are questions for another day." Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 456 F.3d 1069, 1079 n.6 (9th Cir.
2006).
141. Kadic v. Karadjid, 70 F.3d 232, 242-43 (2d Cir. 1996).
142. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 947.
143. Id.
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in exchange for money or food... [as well as] using photos, surveys, and maps in
daily meetings to show the Myanmar Military where to provide security and build
infrastructure."' 44 The panel's opinion thus appears to operate under the assumption
that Unocal's actions might give rise to private liability, but in effect sets a standard for
when a corporation aids and abets a state actor. One must therefore question the future
applicability of the ATCA to private conduct that does not involve state action, even
though the opinion's dicta indicates that Unocal could have been held liable for private
conduct as well. Thus, the problem with this standard lies not only in whether the
ATCA applies to a corporation that aids and abets another private actor, but more
importantly, whether the ATCA will apply to private corporate conduct. This question
illustrates the importance in the panel's failure to specify whether it analyzed Unocal's
complicity with the Burmese government from a private liability standpoint versus a
state action standpoint.
3. Recommendations for a New Standard: Corporate Complicity
Federal courts should take a cue from the ambiguities and vagueness created by the
Ninth Circuit's opinion in Unocal. Absent clarification from Congress,145 a court faced
with a scenario involving corporate liability under the ATCA should specify whether
the facts of a case warrant the establishment and application of a standard for corporate
complicity or a standard for private liability. This Note first recommends changes to
the analysis regarding the actual standard of complicity established by the Ninth
Circuit.
When a judge attempts to establish what constitutes corporate complicity under
customary international law, one reference to which the judge might be tempted to look
is the decisions of international criminal tribunals. However, this approach is not
without complication. The problem with examining international criminal tribunals for
insight on corporate complicity is that these tribunals establish an accomplice standard
for criminal accomplice liability. 146 The dilemma arising from looking to international
criminal tribunals for a tort standard lies in the fact that different standards and
consequences exist between crimes and torts; criminal standards tend to be more
stringent than tort standards. Under the ATCA, a judge must establish a standard of
liability for third-party liability for a civil tort. Thus, the Ninth Circuit looked to
international precedent that does not adequately reflect the circumstances under which
a corporate actor can be held civilly liable as a third party.
Another source to which a judge might look in establishing a standard for corporate
complicity is the general and consistent practice of states. 147 Although doing so might
reflect a more accurate understanding of state behavior with respect to this issue, this
exercise may not produce a satisfactory rule of customary international law. Indeed,
this may prove difficult because specific standards for tort liability-recklessness,
negligence, gross negligence, strict liability-likely vary from state to state.
144. Id. at 952.
145. See infra Part IV.
146. See Haberstroh, supra note 31, at 260-61.
147. For criticism of the Ninth Circuit's choice of law analysis, see id. at 231. He argues that
federal courts should look to the domestic laws of all the countries to determine what is
consistent state practice.
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Another source a judge might consider is the United States' "sense of legal
obligation," or opiniojuris.148 Opiniojuris reflects a better understanding of how the
United States views corporate responsibility under international law and also provides
a more efficient method of crafting a standard of liability. The district court in Doe I v.
Unocal Corp. 149 immediately looked to Section 1983 jurisprudence to determine the
standard of liability of corporate complicity.150 Section 1983 jurisprudence, however,
does not govern acts committed abroad. A statute that does govern acts committed
abroad is the Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA), and it thus represents a more
accurate version of what the United States Congress believes to be its international
legal obligations.'
5
'
The TVPA begins, "An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color
of law, of any foreign nation .... , This statement implicitly defines torture as
requiring state action. However, this statement can also be interpreted as creating a
standard of liability for complicity with state action: an actor will be liable for
complicity with state action if the actor is the state's agent or acts under color of state
law. This standard of liability then opens the door for courts to apply agency law
(actual or apparent authority) or color of law analysis.
Once a court looks to the TVPA for the standard of liability in ATCA
jurisprudence, then it can look to black-letter agency law or Section 1983
jurisprudence to supplement the gaps as to whether a corporation has acted under color
of law. This approach reflects past federal court interpretation of the TVPA. 53 Section
1983 jurisprudence has four criteria for determining whether a private party has acted
under color of law: "public function, state compulsion, nexus, and joint action."' 154
These tests for whether a private party acted under color of law, in addition to the tests
for actual authority and apparent authority, leave a plaintiff with six different theories
under which a corporation may be held liable. However, a judge must first go through
the TVPA "color of law" standard to get to agency law or Section 1983 analysis.
148. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIoNARY (7th ed. 1999) (defining opiniojuris as "[t]he principle that
for conduct or a practice to become a rule of customary international law, it must be shown that
nations believe that international law (rather than moral obligation) mandates the conduct or
practice").
149. 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (C.D. Cal. 2000), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, Doe I v. Unocal
Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated, reh "g granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003).
150. Id. at 1305.
151. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
152. Id.
153. See, e.g., Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259, 315-16 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(confirming that the legislative history of the TVPA requires courts to apply agency or color of
law analysis and that Section 1983 jurisprudence serves as a relevant guide for color of law
questions).
154. Unocal, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1305 (citing George v. Pacific-CSC Work Furlough, 91
F.3d 1227, 1230 (9th Cir. 1996)).
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4. Recommendations for a Standard for Private Corporate
Action Not Under the Color of Law
In deciding whether a corporation should be liable for acts it committed as a private
actor, a federal court should, absent congressional direction,'55 look to the substantive
definitions of the acts identified in Kadic that will trigger private liability. Kadic stated
that individuals could be liable for private actions involving death, torture, and
degrading treatment committed during acts ofgenocide, war crimes, or slavery. 56 This
creates a very limited amount of actual corporate liability. Unless a corporation itself is
single-handedly engaging in acts of genocide, committing war crimes, or engaging in
forced labor (which courts have declared to be a modem variant of slavery 157), then
standards of liability for private acts will not apply.
Given the general substance of these rules of customary international law, only in
extreme situations would the ATCA hold a corporation liable for private action. For
instance, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
defines genocide as:
[A]ny of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the
group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c)
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to
prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to
another group.1
58
This definition requires intent, and thus only in extreme circumstances where plaintiffs
can show that a corporation had the intent to exterminate a group of people will a
corporation face liability under the ATCA for these acts. Using the definition of
genocide as an example, if courts impose private corporate liability only to the acts
Kadic identified as triggering such liability, corporations will face private liability only
for the most extreme and egregious abuses of human rights.
IV. IF CONGRESS DECIDES To TAKE ACTION CONCERNING THE ATCA,
IT SHOULD AMEND THE ACT RATHER THAN REPEAL IT
As soon as a federal court holds a corporation liable under the ATCA, corporations
across the United States likely will urge Congress to take action and repeal the Act
altogether. Instead of repealing the Act, Congress should replicate the steps it took in
the Torture Victim Protection Act and the Military Commissions Act of 2006.59 In
both of these Acts, Congress identified the specific actions that constitute violations of
155. See infra, Part IV.
156. See supra text accompanying note 68.
157. See supra text accompanying note 133.
158. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Article 2.
159. As noted above, the Military Commissions Act of 2006 does prevent federal courts from
exercising ATCA jurisdiction over claims against United States military and personnel
concerning any aspect of the detention of an alien detained as enemy combatant if the alien was
detained after September 11, 2001. See supra note 29.
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these Acts. If Congress specifically identified the types of torts for which a public
official, private individual, or corporation can be held liable under the ATCA,
Congress would: (1) solve the separation-of-powers argument; (2) provide the courts
with specific guidance on which claims have legitimacy under the ATCA, thus
lessening controversies about standards of liability; (3) clarify that the ATCA applies
to purely private action; 60 and (4) put corporations on notice of what rules apply to
their global behavior for purposes of the ATCA, thus solving the "fundamental
fairness" argument advanced by corporations.
A. The Torture Victims Protection Act
The text of the TVPA is straightforward. It allows for civil damages if an
individual, acting as an agent of a state or under color of law, subjects another
individual to torture or extrajudicial killings.' 61 The TVPA places an exhaustion
requirement on the individual bringing the suit and places a ten-year statute of
limitations on the suit. 162 Thus, the TVPA eliminates many of the problems that the
sparse text of the ATCA has generated. Under the TVPA, judges know that individuals
can be held liable in certain circumstances and are aware of the standard of liability.
Judges know for which actions an individual may be held liable, and they also know
that plaintiffs must exhaust remedies available in their home countries. Moreover,
judges know that a plaintiff has only ten years to bring the suit. An amendment to the
ATCA clarifying these ambiguities will be invaluable to plaintiffs, corporations,
judges, and politicians.
B. The Military Commissions Act of2006
In the timeframe following the September 11 attacks and the United States' invasion
of Afghanistan, serious questions arose about the Bush Administration's policies
toward detainees. The government asserted that Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions ("Common Article 3") did not apply to Al Qaeda detainees. 163 The
Supreme Court's decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,164 however, rejected the
government's interpretation of Common Article 3. Hamdan challenged the legality of
the government's established military tribunals.' 65 The Supreme Court held that
although Congress had passed a statute authorizing military tribunals, the government
had not followed Congress's conditions, and these tribunals therefore violated
Common Article 3.166 Congress responded by passing the Military Commissions Act of
160. This would also be consistent with the original intent of the statute; for instance, attacks
on ambassadors by private individuals were one of the concerns the Framers likely had in mind
when they wrote the ATCA. See supra notes 36-43 and accompanying text.
161. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350(2)(a) (2000).
162. Id § 1350(2)(b), (c).
163. INTERNATIONAL LAW: NoRMs, ACTORS, PROCESS, supra note 128, at 1008-09 (citing
Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, White House Counsel, to President George W. Bush,
Decision Re: Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict With
Al Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan. 25, 2002)).
164. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
165. Id. at 2759.
166. Id. at 2798. The Court held that the Geneva Conventions, as laws of war, are judicially
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2006,167 an attempt to give legislative authority and guidance to the military
commissions proposed by President Bush. Whether or not one agrees with the
substance of the 2006 Act,' 68 Congress did create a specific list of acts that will violate
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Among those acts that violate Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Convention are torture, cruel or inhuman treatment,
performance of biological experiments, murder, mutilation or maiming, rape, sexual
assault or abuse, and taking hostages. 169 Congress has thus taken the job of deciding
what violates Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions away from the federal
courts with respect to this issue.
C. A Proposed Revision to the A TCA
Just as it did in the TVPA and the Military Commissions Act of 2006, Congress
should take action, eliminate the phrase "the law of nations," and specifically define
the torts that will support a claim under the ATCA. In addition to specifying the types
of acts that can be enforced under the ATCA, an amended version of the ATCA should
also specify that a plaintiff may bring suit against both natural and legal persons. An
additional benefit of congressional action of this nature is that once Congress specifies
the types of conduct that are actionable, NGOs and human rights organizations can
lobby Congress to further amend the Act to add additional rules subject to the ATCA.
Congress could then, under its discretion, create tort liability for environmental and
other acts that do not fit within Sosa's paradigm-whereas, given Sosa, the judiciary
cannot. Then the debate over the possible expansion of conduct recognizable under the
Act will take place in Congress-a political branch of the United States government-
relieving the courts of any role in the debate.
An amended version of the Act would expand the instances of conduct for which
individuals (whether natural or juridical) can be held liable for private action. While a
federal court must be very careful to stay within the bounds already established by
international law, Congress, as the legislative branch, can and should expand individual
liability beyond what is recognized under customary international law. By doing so,
Congress will put corporations on notice of the types of behavior that will violate the
ATCA, thereby sending a strong message that it will not tolerate egregious corporate
behavior that violates basic notions of human rights and liberties. This message,
emanating from Congress as the representative of the people of the United States,
confers a democratic legitimacy unrealized if liability were imposed by the judiciary.
CONCLUSION
The most attractive solution to solve the current debate surrounding ATCA
jurisprudence and corporate liability is for Congress to amend the Act to clarify how it
enforceable by incorporation through the Military Code of Uniform Justice. Id. at 2794.
167. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a to 950w & 42
U.S.C. § 2000dd-0).
168. See Amnesty International, United States of America, Military Commissions Act of
2006-Turning Bad Policy Into Bad Law, http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/
ENGAMR511542006 (last visited October 19, 2006).
169. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, 2633-34,
§6(b).
2007] 1099
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
applies to corporate behavior overseas. In the amendment, Congress should provide a
detailed list of types of conduct that bring rise to ATCA liability, as well the actors that
can be held liable under the Act. In the absence of such congressional action, however,
federal courts, in formulating standards of liability against corporations, should make
specific distinctions as to whether the standard applies to conduct involving state action
or whether it applies to private action only. In crafting a standard for corporate conduct
involving state action post-Sosa, the courts should not follow the standards formulated
by the district and appellate courts in Unocal, but rather should use the TVPA as their
starting point for the standard, since the TVPA reflects the United States' view of the
nature of its international legal obligations. If federal courts are faced with claims of
private action, they should apply the very narrow standard of liability set forth in
Kadic, which limits personal liability to acts of torture and killing committed in the
course of genocide, war crimes, and slavery.
A congressional amendment will also put corporations on notice of the types of
conduct for which they can be liable under the Act. Such an amendment will provide a
check on corporations that commit gross and egregious human rights violations.
Corporations play critical roles in the world's economies. While some corporations
argue that applying the ATCA against corporations will hinder foreign investment, it is
difficult to accept the argument that when a corporation knowingly engages in or
assists in conduct that results in the most heinous and severe human rights violations,
the corporation is truly "investing" in a foreign country and contributing to that
country's welfare. To the contrary, such acts do little but detract from the historical
progress the world's nations have made toward bettering the lives and minimum
standards of all peoples.
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